In the early twentieth century, the taxation of modern business corporations became increasingly important to the development of American democracy. During that time, governments at all levels began to view business corporations not only as sources of badly needed public revenue, but also as potentially dangerous wielders of concentrated economic power. To combat the growing dominance of corporations, many fiscal reformers sought to use corporate taxation as a mode of regulatory governance. This paper explores the motives and intentions of fiscal reformers during critical junctures in the development of early twentiethcentury U.S. corporate taxation. It seeks to explain how changing historical conditions shaped corporate tax law and policy. More specifically, this paper investigates why activists in the first half of the twentieth century turned to taxation in particular as a technique of corporate regulation. By focusing on the pivotal ideas and actions of key political economists, social commentators, and lawmakers, this paper attempts to answer the question: why did reformers see taxation as a viable form of public control over corporate power?
Introduction
Throughout American history there has been a striking ambivalence toward the taxation of business corporations. On the one hand, there has been a long-standing anti-monopoly tradition that has attempted to use tax laws and policies to restrain the growth and power of business corporations. Yet, on the other hand, during particular historical moments, economic experts and government officials have also designed tax laws and policies to encourage the development of business corporations as effective engines of economic growth and prosperity.
This tension between a desire to protect democratic values against the rising power of corporate capitalism and an effort to reap the economic benefits of big business has come to define the early twentieth-century history of U.S. corporate tax law and policy.
While business corporations have long been a part of American law, economy, and society, it was during the first half of the twentieth century that the tension between using tax policy to control corporate power or to facilitate its growth became increasingly pronounced.
This period witnessed the accelerating rise of large-scale industrial business corporations that threatened to undermine democratic values. As a result, lawmakers during this formative period attempted to use corporate taxation as a means of social control and regulation. But the legal response was not always consistent or coherent. While some policymakers viewed the corporate tax -particularly its collection and possible publicity of information -as a way to limit corporate growth, others believed that the administrative aspects of the levy could be used to manage and harness the power of large-scale corporations. A complex set of mixed motives, in other words, determined the evolution of corporate tax laws and policies.
In this paper, we seek to disentangle the aims and intentions of fiscal reformers during critical junctures in the development of early twentieth-century U.S. corporate taxation. Our central aim is to explain how changing historical conditions have shaped corporate tax laws and policies over time. More specifically, this paper investigates why activists at certain times turned to taxation in particular as a technique of corporate regulation, and why at other times they used tax policy to enable corporate growth. By focusing on the pivotal ideas and actions of key political economists, social commentators, and lawmakers, this paper attempts to explain how and why reformers saw taxation as a viable form of public control over corporate power.
We argue that the corporate tax emerged and developed in the manner it did as a Part III examines the post-WWI decade to illustrate how changing political currents and a moderate recession led to the early retrenchment of certain parts of the wartime fiscal regime.
Although business secured the repeal of the excess profits tax, the reduction of the corporate rate, and a broadening of favorable tax treatment for mergers and acquisitions, many advocates saw these as hollow victories. Congress's adoption of Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon's plan for the pullback of the income tax in lieu of competing proposals to replace it with a national sales tax solidified the place of the corporate income tax in the revenue scheme. This set the stage for the New Deal, which is discussed in Part IV. Not only did the business-friendly policies of the 1920s end when Franklin D. Roosevelt became president, the perception that corporate growth and concentration of economic power contributed to the Crash and ensuing depression led to the embrace of corporate taxation as a regulatory device.
I. The 1909 Levy and the Early Development of Corporate Taxation
Even before lawmakers began considering a corporate tax in 1909, there were several broader forces and seminal events that brought tax reform and corporate regulation to the forefront of national policymaking. First and foremost among these forces was the accelerating growth of corporate capitalism. Indeed, between 1895 and 1904, during what scholars have dubbed "the great merger movement," U.S. manufacturing firms consolidated at a remarkable, pace due to a confluence of historical factors. During that brief period, nearly two thousand companies combined with former rivals to create some of the nation's largest industrial corporations -many of which continue to exist today. 2 Unlike previous periods of corporate growth, the turn-of-the-century merger movement hastened the institutional convergence of industrial manufacturing and finance capital. Consequently, the ownership of corporate wealth gradually became more dispersed among the American elite, and a spirit of financial speculation and an ideology of "shareholder democracy" began to take shape.
As these large-scale industrial corporations came to dominate the American economic and political landscape, tax reformers and lawmakers took notice. The growing concentration of corporations in the Northeast industrial sector provided populist tax reformers, particularly those from the agrarian South and West, with an easy target. They pointed to the wealthy shareholders and managers of the new, large-scale industrial firms as the type of individual taxpayers who had the ability and obligation to bear a growing share of the costs of underwriting a modern state.
For other progressive reformers, the colossal corporations themselves were seen as sources of tax revenue and as citizens in their own right -citizens that had a social duty under the principles of fiscal citizenship to contribute to the commonwealth. For more pragmatic state-builders, the development of a "corporate-administered" phase of American capitalism provided new "tax handles" with which to assess and collect personal and business incomes. 4 As income and economic power became concentrated in large, integrated business corporations, it became easier for government authorities to identify and access sources of tax revenue. Thus, corporate and individual income became more visible and "legible" for taxing authorities.
5
In addition to the growing public salience of corporations, the resurgence of the protective tariff and the increasing attention to economic inequality also contributed to bringing tax reform and corporate regulation to the fore. As tariff revenue increased steadily during the first decade of the twentieth century, protectionism was once again associated with an increasing cost of living. Although the annual rate of inflation in the early 1900s was rather moderate (averaging about two percent annually), the perception among many ordinary Americans was that the widening scale and scope of import duties was raising the prices of the "necessaries of life," and unduly protecting domestic monopolies. 6 Because the tariff affected the price of many underscored the regulatory potential of a corporate tax. Indeed, the president spelled out how the tax in a "perfectly legitimate and effective" way could help the government, stockholders, and the greater public gain "knowledge of the real business transactions and the gains and profits of every corporation in the country." By making the inner dealings of big businesses more transparent, the corporate tax, Taft insisted, would be a "long step toward that supervisory control of corporations which may prevent a further abuse of power." 22 Taft's many references to the public disclosure aspects of the law suggested that he believed the tax could be used to do much more than just raise revenue from wealthy shareholders.
23
In its final form, the 1909 law contained a tax on the legal privilege of doing business in corporate form. In particular, the law required "every corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for profit and having a capital stock represented by shares" to pay a "special excise tax with respect to the carrying on of doing business." 24 The tax was set at an annual flat rate of one percent on net income above $5,000, and even applied to all foreign corporations engaged in business in the United States. 25 The law also contained the controversial public disclosure feature that Taft had recommended. Yet, even the 1898 excise tax was enacted for differing reasons. On the one hand, the statute's legislative history and its general application to all sugar and oil refinery businesses, not just corporations, suggest that lawmakers were not singling out corporations as regulatory targets, but rather that they were using the excise levy as a proxy to tax the owners of sugar and oil companies, and hence generate the revenue necessary to prosecute a war. 29 power of corporate capital. Furthermore, since the 1898 law did not contain disclosure requirements, lawmakers seemed less concerned about transparency as a form of public control, and more interested in using the levy to curb the growing profits of specific corporations.
31
Unlike the earlier corporate taxes, which were temporary measures in response to wartime emergencies, the 1909 levy paved the way for a more permanent corporate tax. In fact, after the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified in 1913 and a comprehensive income tax enacted in that same year, the corporate excise tax was replaced with a direct tax on corporate incomes.
This new corporate income tax acted as a complement to the individual income tax. The new law provided a "normal" tax of one percent on all individual and corporate income above certain exemption levels. It also enacted a graduated set of "surtaxes" on individual income that ranged from one to six percent on income above $20,000. Because shareholders were exempt from paying the normal tax rate on dividends, the normal rate on their corporate income was merely applied at the corporate rather than the individual level. With this system in place, only truly wealthy shareholders paid a graduated surtax on corporate dividends.
32
The adoption of progressive rates, however, complicated the taxation of corporate income. With higher individual surtax rates, there was an incentive for corporations to retain earnings rather than distribute them as dividends to individual shareholders. This meant that the corporate form could be used to avoid graduated individual income taxes. To combat this, lawmakers enacted a highly subjective penalty provision: shareholders of a corporation that retained earnings for the purpose of avoiding the shareholder-level surtax on dividends would be subject to surtaxes on their pro rata share of the earnings as if they had been distributed. In effect, this provision provided partnership-like, pass-through tax treatment for those corporations that were deemed to be tax avoidance vehicles. Thus, because of its progressive rate structure, riddled by a variety of complex justifications. As the costs of conducting a global war increased, the need for new and sustained revenues pushed Congress to enact steeply progressive income tax rates. At the same time, the robust demand for wartime goods and material provided an opportunity for some industrial corporations to benefit enormously from the war effort. To prevent unreasonable war profiteering, lawmakers enacted several innovative profits taxes.
Although these levies were intended to act as constraints on "unreasonable" corporate profits, they frequently had unanticipated consequences. In fact, by the end of the war the steeply progressive rates and the new profits taxes led some experts to wonder whether the tax regime was unnecessarily hindering the development of corporate capital.
Even before the U.S. officially entered the war in April 1917, the need for war preparedness led lawmakers to transform the federal tax system. The Revenue Act of 1916, in fact, initiated a series of wartime tax measures that significantly shifted the national tax system away from its traditional reliance on indirect and regressive consumption taxes to the modern system of direct and progressive taxation. The 1916 law increased individual and corporate rates, adopted a federal estate tax, as well as a net receipts tax on munitions makers. The revenue acts that followed not only transformed the American fiscal system, they also ushered in a revolution in administrative capacity, as the power and personnel of the U.S. Treasury Department increased dramatically. By focusing the new national tax powers on the wealthiest Americans, and rejecting a broad-based mass income or sales tax, the Woodrow Wilson administration and its congressional allies set a clear tone: the World War One tax regime would be focused on "soaking the rich."
37
There was, to be sure, some resistance to the new "soak-the-rich" wartime tax regime.
Most business interests limited their opposition to private correspondence with policymakers because they were profiting tremendously from the war, and because they feared that their protests would be interpreted as anti-patriotic. Still, politically conservative interests preferred to finance the war with a mix of consumption taxes and bonds rather than steeply progressive income or munitions levies. Populist lawmakers, by contrast, initially used the threat of highly progressive taxation to try to blunt the war effort. On the eve of the war, Claude Kitchin (D-N.C.), the House majority leader and powerful chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, did not hide his sectional bias. When wealthy New York citizens, he wrote, "are thoroughly convinced that the income tax will have to pay for the increase in the army and navy, they will not be one-half so frightened over the future invasion of Germany and preparedness will not be so popular with them as it now is. armament producers, the newly created excess-profits tax applied to profits "over a reasonable return on invested capital" and affected all businesses, not just those in the munitions industry.
40
A tax on excess profits reflected the belief that the broader public, operating through the powers of the state, had a legitimate stake in collecting excess private gains generated by war profiteering. Although other nations were already using excess profits taxes as a funding source for the war, the unprecedented turn to this levy by the United States signaled the Wilson administration's desire to alter the concept and meaning of business profits -at least during the war. The term "excess" implied that there was some reasonable level of earnings that a business was entitled to, but that any surplus amount above that level was "unreasonable" or "abnormal."
Such surpluses generated by the war were deemed to be windfall gains that exceeded a legitimate amount of financial profit. At a time when ordinary Americans were sacrificing life and limb, the enactment of an excess profits tax expressed a growing indignation with war profiteering and a demand for shared sacrifice that was at the heart of the Wilson administration's sense of fiscal citizenship.
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Indeed, social concerns over excessive and unscrupulous war profiteering drove the demands for an excess-profits tax. As early as 1917, calls for the "conscription of wealth" to match the conscription of men began to fill the editorial pages of the country's leading publications. 42 Similarly, the popular journal The Outlook documented "the extraordinary increase in profits" among the leading industrial concerns. Comparing the profits of over one hundred companies from 1914 to 1916, the editors calculated that the aggregate profits of these corporations "exceed the profits of the year in which the war began by over a billion dollars."
From this statistical evidence, The Outlook joined other leading popular periodicals in supporting an excess-profits tax to make "the war-brides pay up." 43 40 Eight percent was established as the "reasonable rate of return," and all profits above that level were taxed at graduated rates ranging from eight percent to a maximum of 60 percent on corporate profits that were in excess of 32 percent of invested capital. As many experts predicted, the excess-profits tax did not always operate as intended.
Treasury Department economist, Thomas S. Adams, conducted a study of the excess profits tax in the summer of 1918 that documented how the levy was having perverse implications. The existing law, with its use of "invested capital" as the baseline for determining "excess profits," was adversely affecting small businesses more than the large corporations it was designed to attack. Larger corporations, Adams concluded, were able to manipulate the law to reduce their tax liability. By increasing their invested capital, either by issuing more equity or by increasing their investments in intangible assets or through other accounting maneuvers, they could inflate the base from which their rates of return and profits were calculated, thereby placing their net profits in a lower tax bracket. By contrast, smaller enterprises, especially those that relied mainly on personal services such as family businesses, did not have high levels of capital to begin with, nor did they have the slack or flexibility to adjust their capital levels or annual investments. Thus, they were hardest hit by the excess profits tax.
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Despite the uncertain effect of the excess profits tax, there were some lawmakers and experts who believed a revised profits levy could be used as a permanent measure to combat monopoly power. Eventually, the Treasury Department was able to convince lawmakers that a hybrid excess profits and war profits tax could be used to fund the remaining war effort. By hinging the calculation of "war profits" to a pre-war level of acceptable profits, the new hybrid levy was reframed as a temporary measure, one that could be -and was -easily dismantled after the war. Indeed, when the war officially ended in the spring of 1919, the excess profits tax was one of the first targets of the fiscal conservatives who swept into office.
Although excess profits taxation was quickly eliminated, the overall thrust of the new income tax regime did not wither away after the conflict. The ultimate success of the income and profits tax regime demonstrated the federal government's ability to underwrite a global war with a robust tax system. This success convinced reformers, lawmakers, and tax administrators that a direct and progressive tax system -especially one with a strong corporate income and profits tax component -could be used both to collect badly needed revenue and to discipline corporate war profiteering.
III. The 1920s and the Mellon Plan
The aftershocks of World War I continued to reverberate at the outset of the 1920s. The dislocation occasioned by the war's end and a sharp drop in prices ushered in a significant recession between 1920 and 1922. 47 Furthermore, the heavy wartime taxes remained after armistice as the country strained to cover the war bill. and rose to a whopping 77 percent at war's end, with commentators calling it "the greatest burden that had ever been laid upon the American people. One particular target of business tax reformers was the excess profits tax. As they had during the war, critics of the levy noted its contradictory implications. The National Association of Manufacturers contended that the public equated "excess" with "illegal" profits, and the levy incentivized corporations to undertake inefficient projects on deductible expenses, thereby artificially depressing investor returns. 52 Not only was the tax viewed as problematic in concept, it was also considered complex in operation, requiring significant audits, frequent appeals, and lengthy process before liability could be established. Indeed, the uncertainty the tax generated was itself considered a threat to business. move more quickly to scale back the wartime tax regime, complaining that the 1921 Act did not go far enough in aiding business and investors. 61 These critics viewed the repeal of the excess profits tax as a start, but the amendments to the income tax only served to lessen the negative impact of a tax that had outlived its usefulness with the passing of the exigencies of war.
The problem was that the business community itself could not agree on a suitable alternative to the excess profits tax. A national sales tax was the most promising proposal, but business split on whether to support it. Many business trade groups supported a sales tax, ranging from the Business Men's National Tax Committee to the New York Board of Trade.
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Other organizations, though, such as the National Industrial Conference Board, the National Association of Credit Men, the National Association of Retail Grocers, and the Committee of Manufacturers and Merchants of Chicago all opposed the various sales tax proposals. Their concern was that the tax would effectively act as a gross receipts tax and if business could not easily shift the cost to consumers, it could be particularly damaging to businesses with higher costs and lower margins.
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The resulting compromise -the Mellon Plan -was both a rejection of a complete retreat from the pre-war era and a continuation of the more business friendly tax policies enacted in 1921. Under the Mellon Plan, a steep reduction of the top combined personal income tax rates from 77 percent at the end of the war to 25 percent by 1927 was coupled with a modest increase in the corporate rate from 10 percent to 13.5 percent over the same period. This was more probusiness than it might at first appear. The corporate rate increases were viewed as a substitute for the revenues from the excess profits tax in 1921 and the capital stock tax in 1924, 64 both of which most businesses viewed to be more odious than the corporate income tax.
Moreover, the drop in the top individual rates was considered necessary to spur business investment. In his 1924 book written to garner popular support for the plan, Mellon wrote, 61 The high rates inevitably put pressure upon the taxpayer to withdraw his capital from productive business and invest it in tax-exempt securities or to find other lawful methods of avoiding the realization of taxable income. The result is that the sources of taxation are drying up; wealth is failing to carry its share of the tax burden; and capital is being diverted into channels which yield neither revenue to the Government nor profit to the people. 65 Mellon particularly highlighted the example of the railroad industry, noting that "[it] is estimated that the railroads will require a billion dollars a year of new capital in order satisfactorily to provide the facilities and equipment requisite to handle the traffic presented and to reduce the cost of transportation." The existing tax rules, Mellon contended, were impeding the proper flow of capital. "If the railroads are to be furnished with capital, much of it must come from the sale of stock and to permit any sale surtaxes must be reduced as to attract the large investor to that type of security." 66 Throughout the 1920s, Progressives and their allies continued to beat the drum for using tax as a tool for corporate regulation, but any victories were small and short-lived. For example, they repeatedly attempted to revive the publicity requirement originally enacted in 1909 for corporate tax returns, but now they sought to apply it to all returns. After a public inspection requirement was defeated in 1921, Congress finally adopted a provision in 1924 requiring public inspection of both the names of corporate and individual taxpayers and the amount of taxes they paid. During deliberations over this requirement, then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover had warned that publicity would particularly harm businesses, arguing that the publicity of returns during Reconstruction was partly responsible for the economic difficulties of the time. 67 By 1926, the anti-publicity movement got the upper hand and the amount of tax paid was no longer made public. 68 Similarly, as part of the deliberations over the Revenue Act of 1928, Congress considered a graduated corporate income tax that would for the first time tax the "bigness" that Louis
Brandeis had decried more than a decade earlier. 69 Business immediately assailed the proposal.
The Wall Street Journal called it "a direct challenge to the 'Big Business' savoring of the old trust busting days," complaining that it would "penalize the stockholders of the large corporations, such as the railroads" and that it was "essentially an excess profits tax" without the use of the more equitable invested capital standard. 70 Although the House approved the proposal, it was later rejected in the Senate in favor of a one percentage point reduction of the single corporate rate and an increase in the exemption from $2,000 to $3,000 for corporations with incomes of $25,000 or less. 71 For at least a little while longer, business concerns still trumped in the tax arena.
IV. The 1930s and the New Deal on Corporate Taxation
The stock market crash of 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression forced a reexamination of many governmental policies, most notably in the corporate arena. This time, however, the prescription for the economic situation was decidedly less business friendly than it had been a decade earlier. Whereas corporations were seen as part of the solution in 1921, and therefore to be protected from or encouraged by taxation, after the Crash corporations were seen as part of the problem and tax reform was viewed as part of the solution.
One of the most significant changes in the intervening decade was the continued rise of large corporations and the dominance of large corporate groups and their owners in the economy.
As policymakers began to investigate the causes of the economic downturn, the growth of big business was identified as a contributing factor. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis effectively captured the prevailing sentiment in this new era, writing that "coincident with the growth of these giant corporations, there has occurred a marked concentration of individual wealth, and . . . the resulting disparity in incomes is a major cause of the existing depression. Moley and other Brain Trusters outlined a national program for recovery. 73 One of the key prongs was to address the problem of corporate "hoarding," or retaining earnings to pay for expansion or to hold as a private "war chest" rather than distributing them as dividends. Adolf
Berle, a Columbia law professor who was responsible for this section of the memo, wrote that "this attempt of corporations to provide for a rainy day was really the thing which itself brought on the rainy day. The expansion doubly upset the balance of production and consumption." 74 Berle had just completed his work with economist Gardiner Means on their seminal book, The
Modern Corporation in Private Property, before being recruited to help develop Roosevelt's economic platform. 75 Based on the insights gleaned from that research and fellow Columbia professor Rex Tugwell's research on the misallocation of capital resources in the corporate economy, 76 Berle advised that "we should carefully consider a modification of taxes on corporate income, aimed at discouraging undue accumulation of corporate reserves, and stimulating distribution of such reserves to the millions of small investors who are their rightful owners."
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Committee on Banking and Currency authorized an inquiry to investigate the causes of the stock market crash. 79 The subsequent hearings, known as the Pecora hearings after Ferdinand Pecora, the aggressive lead counsel for the Committee, 80 contained substantial revelations of corporate abuses, including rampant tax avoidance through largely legal maneuvers.
The Pecora Hearings only fanned the flames for those seeking to use corporate tax reform as a means of regulating corporations. 81 In 1933, the House authorized a study of the internal revenue system to investigate some of the sensational revelations from Pecora's investigation. holding companies and the overcapitalization of business." 82 The Report also recommended eliminating the ability of a group of affiliated corporations to file a consolidated return, which was characterized as an attempt "to strike at the holding company system." 83 In the Revenue Act of 1934, both of the subcommittee recommendations were scaled back, but nevertheless they were adopted in a way that suggested a momentum shift in corporate taxation. Rather than proposing to repeal the reorganization provisions, which Treasury the tax-free reorganization. 87 The foundation for the proposal to repeal the consolidated return was laid even before
Roosevelt assumed office and the subcommittee issued its report. It was based on the growing concern about holding companies, which first appeared at the turn-of-the-century as states relaxed their restrictions on corporations holding stock in other corporations, and in particular about the use of pyramidal structures that enabled investors at the top of the pyramid to leverage a relatively small investment in one corporation into control over a vast empire. 88 The consolidated return appeared to "penalize[] David and assist Goliath." 89 The fear was that consolidated returns had enabled these corporate groups to drive out competition through predatory pricing while at the same time avoiding taxation on monopoly profits, all by using the losses from one subsidiary to offset the gains from another. As Missouri Democrat Charles Cannon explained, An electric company or telephone branch or transportation company pays little attention to the cost of installing new services. A railroad company can run a bus line at a loss, a streetcar company can operate a line of taxicabs, or a power company can preempt a new community at a loss. Through the benevolent provisions of this law they charge these losses against their profits elsewhere and reduce their taxes while destroying competition and monopolizing the market.
Congress rejected Cannon's proposal to repeal the consolidated return in the Revenue Act of 1932, but it did subject corporate groups to a penalty tax that rose to as much as one percent for the privilege of filing a consolidated return. 91 House Speaker John Nance Garner (D-TX) described how the penalty tax served as a compromise between those seeking to use taxation to battle corporate abuse and those worried that the tax reform would kill the golden goose: "[i]f it is advantageous to them to file such returns they will pay the penalty. If there is no advantage in consolidated and affiliated returns, they will submit separate returns." These measures against "bigness," which were both adopted in the Revenue Act of 1935, hardly imposed the kind of rates or penalties one would need to truly reshape the corporate landscape by force. 95 Roosevelt's original proposal for graduated corporate rates suggested replacing a flat rate of 13.75 percent with a scheme rising from 10.75 percent to 16.75 percent.
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The final Act imposed a 12.5 percent rate on income below $2,000 up to a 15 percent rate on income above $40,000. 97 Neither was likely to make bigness unprofitable. Similarly, the intercorporate dividends tax was actually just a reduction of the 100 percent exemption for dividends received by a corporate shareholder to a 90 percent exemption, amounting to an effective tax of 1.5 percent on intercorporate dividends. 98 Even progressive sources were dubious about the measures. The New Republic claimed that "it will scarcely break up the big industrial units, nor will it restore enough competition to make any visible difference. When defeating the proposal became unlikely, business leaders pushed to neutralize its distributive force. They favored retaining the tax on dividends so that the penalty for a distribution would cancel out the penalty for retaining earnings. The goal was to realign managers and shareholders on the question of dividend policy, at the price of effectively introducing double taxation of corporate income. 111 As enacted in the Revenue Act of 1936, the top rate of 27 percent on undistributed profits was identical to the lowest surtax rate for incomes in excess of $44,000.
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The demise of the undistributed profits tax, and indeed the regulatory movement in corporate taxation generally, began in the summer of 1937. Much like in the early 1920s, when reformers cited the post-war recession as a justification for business friendly corporate tax policy, one of the swiftest economic slowdowns in history created a window of opportunity for business groups. 113 Critics blamed the undistributed profits tax for a myriad of economic problems, ranging from rising unemployment and growing stock market volatility to strikes by capital and declining business confidence. 114 In 1939, Congressional leaders and Treasury and Administration officials jointly negotiated a business tax aid program that (1) eliminated the undistributed profits tax, (2) liberalized the capital stock tax, (3) eliminated the limit on capital loss deductions for corporations, and (4) permitted corporations to carryforward losses for two or three years. 115 By 1942, the ban on consolidated returns was also lifted. 116 Toward the end of World War II, it was clear that the shift away from a regulatory approach to corporate taxation was complete. J. Keith Butters and John Lintner of the Harvard
Business School had published a number of influential and well-publicized studies in the spring of 1944 documenting the extent to which the post-war recovery could be harmed by the corporate tax burden. 117 This started a flurry of corporate tax reform proposals. During the summer, three high-profile corporate tax reform proposals designed to aid business in the transition to the post-war economy were released within weeks of each other. 118 Many groups soon followed with their own plans, leading to almost sixty proposals being in circulation at one
